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The “Reasonable Plant” Test: When Progress
Outruns the Constitution
Max Stul Oppenheimer*
INTRODUCTION
As the world searches for new sources of energy,
attention has focused on renewable sources, such as
plants. One approach to motivating investments in new
technology is to provide limited term monopolies through
the patent statute. With the passage of the TownsendPurnell Plant Patent Act (PPA)1 in 1930, the United States
became the first country in the world to provide a form of
patent protection for plants.2 At the time, Francis Crick
was a student3 and James Watson had just celebrated his
second birthday4—their discovery of the helical structure
of DNA was more than twenty-two years in the future. 5
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1
. Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent Act, ch. 312, § 1, 46 Stat. 376
(1930) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2000)) [hereinafter
PPA].
2
. “Plants were first explicitly brought within the scope of patent
protection in 1930 when the PPA included ‘plants’ among the useful
things subject to patents.” J.E.M. AG Supply v. Pioneer Hi-bred Int’l, 534
U.S. 124, 132 (2001). Even today, international patent harmonization
agreements allow countries to deny patent protection to plants.
“Members may . . . exclude from patentability . . . plants and animals
other than micro-organisms . . . .” Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C art. 27(3)(b), Apr. 15, 1994,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/ legal_e/27-trips.pdf.
3
. NobelPrize.org, Francis Crick: The Nobel Prize in Physiology or
Medicine
1962,
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1962/
crickbio.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
4
. NobelPrize.org, James Watson: The Nobel Prize in Physiology or
Medicine
1962,
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1962/
watsonbio.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
5
. Steve Sternberg, Double Helix Unlocked Key to Life, USA TODAY,
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Convinced that advances in agriculture deserved patent
protection, Congress attempted to accommodate the core
concepts of patent law to the technology of plant
propagation that existed at the time, in essence defining a
plant by its physical rather than genetic characteristics.6
This required bending traditional patent rules, but although
Congress gave plant patent applicants the necessary
latitude, it also required them to use reasonable efforts to
meet the standard rules.7
Developments in biotechnology since 1930 have been
dramatic. Scientific advances have not only undercut the
need for the special rules created by the PPA but have also
created a trap, which may deprive modern inventors of
protection for the development of novel plants. Moreover,
while new applicants can avoid it, the owners of thousands
of issued plant patents have fallen into the trap and cannot
remedy the error unless Congress provides relief.8
This article describes the enduring core principles of
utility patent law and identifies those that posed special
problems for the agriculture industry in 1930 and led to the
adoption of a sui generis plant patent law.
It then
demonstrates that, although the statute which controls
plant patents has not changed significantly since its
adoption in 1930, changes in biotechnology have in effect
rewritten the requirements for patentability in a way which
renders most recently granted plant patents invalid.
Finally, it demonstrates how future applicants can avoid the
trap which has been created by advancing technology, and
proposes changes in the statute which could save those
patents already issued and, in the process, improve the
examination of plant patent applications and provide
stronger protection for the agriculture industry.

I.

CORE PRINCIPLES OF U.S. PATENT LAW

While U.S. patent law has been amended several times
since 1930,9 certain core principles have remained the
Feb. 24, 2003, at D01.
6
. Rev. Stat. § 4886, as amended by Act of May 23, 1930, ch. 312, §
1, 46 Stat. 376 (current version split between 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 & 161
(2000)).
7
. Id.
8
. See infra Part V, notes 120–122 and accompanying text.
9
. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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same and could not be changed without fundamentally
altering the system. The power to create a patent system
arises under Article I Section 8 of the Constitution, which
authorized Congress to reward innovation by granting
monopolies on inventions for a limited time.10 The power is
exercised in Title 35 of the U. S. Code.11
Three types of patents are authorized: utility patents,
design patents, and plant patents.12 The utility patent
provisions authorize granting patents for inventions within
one of four classes enumerated in the statute;13 the design
patent
provisions
authorize
granting
patents
for
ornamental designs;14 and the plant patent provisions
authorize granting patents for distinct and new varieties of
plants that have been asexually reproduced.15
All three types of patents share (and have shared since
their inception) certain core patent principles. All require
disclosure, and eventually publication, of the claimed
10

. “The Congress shall have Power . . . to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. For a detailed analysis of how
the clause entered the Constitution, see Walterscheid, To Promote the
Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the
Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 1, 31–34 (1994).
11
. 35 U.S.C. (2000).
12
. “Patents issued under § 161 are referred to as ‘plant patents,’
which are distinguished from § 101 utility patents and § 171 design
patents.” J.E.M. AG Supply v. Pioneer Hi-bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 133 n.5
(2001).
13
. “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, . . . may obtain a
patent . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). Certain types of inventions that fall
within one of these so-called statutory categories are not patentable
under judicially created exceptions.
Under current Supreme Court
caselaw “Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental
processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they
are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.” Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas are also unpatentable. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,
185 (1981). “[Phenomena of nature] . . . are part of the storehouse of
knowledge . . . . They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all
men and reserved exclusively to none.” Funk Bros. Seed v. Kalo
Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
14
. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2000).
15
. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2000). Tuber propagated plants were excluded
by the statute for political reasons. See infra note 66 and accompanying
text.
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invention.16 The fundamental bargain is the inventor’s
surrender of the details of an innovation in exchange for
the patent, thereby putting the public in possession of
information which the inventor could have kept confidential
and giving the inventor an assured term of exclusive
control over the invention.17 The bargain assures that the
technology will not be lost.18 The vehicle for providing the
required disclosure is the filing of a written application with
the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).19 The application
process is designed to assure that the public has gotten fair
value in the bargain; it requires determinations that the
applicant is providing something the public did not already
have20 and the applicant has provided an enabling
description of the invention so that, once the patent
expires, the public will be able to make and use the
invention.21 In addition, the application must include claims
which put competitors on notice as to what they can and
cannot do.22 Thus, these core principles establish a system
with the following characteristics:
1. The applicant for a patent must provide the patent
office with enough information to determine whether what
is claimed is in fact new and not obvious—this assures that
the public does not pay the price of granting a monopoly
for something in which it already has or, in the ordinary
16

. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2000).
. The patent owner’s control is exclusive, meaning the right to
exclude, but not exhaustive—the patent owner can only prevent others
from making, using, selling or importing the patented invention. 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(a) (2000).
18
. Ex parte Moore, 115 U.S.P.Q. 145, 147 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf.
1957) (awarding inventorship to one who reproduced a peach tree over
the first to notice the tree, since the objective of advancing the progress
of science and useful arts was furthered by the applicant, whose actions
had preserved for posterity a variety that otherwise would have been
lost).
19
. Regulations governing review of patent applications are contained
in Volume 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations, see 37 C.F.R. (2007),
and specific internal rules governing the examination of patent
applications are contained in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(MPEP), U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE , MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
(8th ed. 2001, rev. Sept. 2007) [hereinafter MPEP].
20
. The claimed invention must be novel, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000), and
non-obvious, 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
21
. The application must be sufficiently detailed to allow one of
ordinary skill in the relevant field to make and use the invention. 35
U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
22
. Id.
17
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course of events, would have access to. Patents have
always been limited to novel inventions.23 As an incentive
to add to public knowledge, a patent cannot be granted on
something which would restrict something already
available to the public24 or which would be obvious to
others of ordinary skill in the relevant field.25 As explained
by the Supreme Court in KSR International v. Teleflex,
“Granting patent protection to advances that would occur
in the ordinary course without real innovation retards
progress and may, in the case of patents combining
previously known elements, deprive prior inventions of
their value or utility.”26
2. The applicant must provide sufficient detail that
(once the patent expires) others will be able to make and
use the invention.27
3. The applicant must specifically claim the invention,
both so that the patent office can focus its evaluation of
patentability and so that, if issued as a patent, others will
23

. 35 U.S.C. § 101 provides: “Whoever invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101
(2000).
35 U.S.C. § 102 provides:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign
country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent,
or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale
in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the
application for patent in the United States . . . .
24
. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
25
. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000) (“A patent may not be obtained though
the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in
section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains.”).
26
. 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1732 (2007).
27
. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (“The specification shall contain a written
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making
and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most
nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.”).
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know what they are excluded from making, using, selling or
importing.
Under utility patent law (as it exists today and as it
existed in 1930), claims which the patent office determines
comply with the statutory requirements may be issued as a
patent. The issued patent gives its owner the right to stop
others from making, using, or selling products (or
processes) incorporating the claimed invention during the
term of the patent.28

II. THE PROBLEM OF PLANTS CIRCA 1930
Prior to enactment of the PPA, it was commonly
believed that the general utility patent rules posed special
problems when applied to plants. As explained by the
Supreme Court,
[p]rior to 1930, two factors were thought to remove plants from
patent protection. The first was the belief that plants, even those
artificially bred, were products of nature for purposes of the
patent law. . . . The second obstacle to patent protection for
plants was the fact that plants were thought not amenable to the
“written description”[29] requirement of the patent law.30

As the Supreme Court has since made clear, those
fears were unfounded: plants can be covered under both
28

. The claims must define “the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). Post-1930 revisions to
the statute added importation to the list of activities a patent owner may
control. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
29
. 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that a patent application describe the
invention “in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art” to make and use it. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
30
. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 311–12 (1980). See also
David G. Scalise & Daniel Nugent, International Intellectual Property
Protections for Living Matter: Biotechnology, Multinational Conventions
and the Exception for Agriculture, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 83, 91 (1995)
(“When a new plant differed from the old only in color, scent or texture, it
was almost impossible to satisfy the written description requirement.
Consequently, plant breeders were denied substantive protection for their
discoveries, derailing innovation in this field.”); Anne E. Crocker, Will
Plants Finally Grow Into Full Patent Protection on an International Level?:
A Look at the History of U.S. and International Patent Law Regarding
Patent Protection for Plants and the Likely Changes After the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Decision in J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 8 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 251, 257 (2003) (“One important feature of the PPA is that it
helped plant breeders overcome the barrier of the written description
requirements for obtaining a utility patent. Developments in traditional
plant breeding were hard to record on paper with sufficient detail to
satisfy the written requirements of § 112, yet generally these
developments could easily be seen with the naked eye.”).
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the specific provisions created by the PPA31 and, if they
meet the requirements of the general utility provisions,32
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.33 The specific provisions of the Plant
Patent Act do not preempt the general provisions of the
utility patent statute,34 plant materials are clearly
compositions of matter (or manufactures)35 and, in
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court rejected the
argument that living matter was implicitly excluded from
statutory subject matter.36
When, acting in the erroneous37 belief that plants were
not patentable, Congress concluded that agricultural
advances should be afforded the same type of protection
as technological inventions,38 it faced several challenges in
fitting 1930s plant technology into the framework of the
patent statute.

A. COULD PLANTS BE STATUTORY SUBJECT MATTER?
The first challenge was whether plants fit the
requirements of statutory subject matter.39 Although the
line of Supreme Court cases defining the “natural
phenomenon” exclusion from statutory subject matter had
not yet been decided,40 it was generally believed that
31

. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2000).
. “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent . . .”
33
. J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., 534 U.S. 124, 145
(2001).
34
. Id.
35
. Id. at 147. See also Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443, 444 (Bd.
Pat. App. & Interf. 1985).
36
. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
37
. While the belief that plants were not patentable may have been
erroneous, Congress was certainly correct that the practical problems of
complying with the patent requirements in 1930 would have been almost
impossible for plants. “In 1930, no written description could have
enabled creation of a plant, even if the ancestry and techniques of crosspollination were known—it was not possible to produce the plant from a
disclosure contemplated by 35 U.S.C. § 112 for other types of
manufactured articles. Thus, a reasonably complete description of the
new plant variety is all that could be required.” In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d
929, 935 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
38
. S. REP. NO. 71-315, at 1 (1930).
39
. See supra notes 12–14, 29–38 and accompanying text.
40
. See Funk Bros. Seed v. Kalo Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)
(noting that phenomena of nature are part of the storehouse of nature
32

MAX STUL OPPENHEIMER, "THE 'REASONABLE PLANT' TEST: WHEN PROGRESS OUTRUNS
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 417-452 (2008).

THE

CONSTITUTION ," 9(2)

424

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
[Vol. 9:2
plants were unpatentable,41 even those “made by man.”42
The dissent in Laboratory Corporation of America v.
Metabolite Labs43 explains the philosophy behind exclusion
of natural phenomena from patentable subject matter:
The relevant principle of law “[e]xclude[s] from . . . patent
protection . . . laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” . . . .
The justification for the principle does not lie in any claim that
“laws of nature” are obvious, or that their discovery is easy, or
that they are not useful. To the contrary, research into such
matters may be costly and time-consuming; . . . and that
research may prove of great benefit to the human race. Rather,
the reason for the exclusion is that sometimes too much patent
protection can impede rather than “promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts,” the constitutional objective of patent
and copyright protection. . . .
The problem arises from the fact that patents do not only
encourage research by providing monetary incentives for
invention. Sometimes their presence can discourage research by
impeding the free exchange of information . . . .44

B. COULD

A

PLANT

BE

DESCRIBED

AND

ENABLED?

The second problem facing a potential applicant for a
patent on a plant was how to meet the requirement that
the invention be described and enabled—how to provide a
written patent application which would satisfy the second
core principal of putting the invention in the public domain
once the patent expired.45
While an applicant could
certainly point out characteristics which distinguished their
new plant from other plants, often these characteristics
would be difficult to establish objectively, as indicated by
early plant patents issued under the 1930 statute. (For
and free for all to use); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)
(noting that phenomena of nature are not patentable because they are
the basic tools for scientific and technological work).
41
. J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 133
(2001), although that belief was wrong; Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 311–12 (1980).
42
. As explained by the Supreme Court “Prior to 1930, two factors
were thought to remove plants from patent protection. The first was the
belief that plants, even those artificially bred, were products of nature for
purposes of the patent law. . . .” Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 311–12.
Chakrabarty held that the patent statute extended to “anything under the
sun made by man”, including living organisms. Id. at 309.
43
. 548 U.S. 124 (2006).
44
. Id. at 127 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
45
. See INTRODUCTION, supra.
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example, “good flavor,”46 “superior reproductive and
keeping qualities,”47 “extreme hardiness,”48 “superior
producing qualities,”49 or “firmness of flesh,”50 or whose
color is “between red and carmine,”51 or which ripens late52
were characterizations used.) Even if that problem could
have been overcome with standardized terms, a second
element of the application requirement could not have
been met in 1930: enablement. In a case which was
decided after the Plant Patent Act was enacted, the Patent
Office Board of Interference Examiners noted that “the
mere filing of an application for a patent for a new variety
of plant would not enable anyone to reproduce such a
plant.”53 The same principle led to the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeal’s decision (again following enactment of
the Plant Patent Act) that a photograph of a rose bush
could not defeat a patent on the same rose bush since the
photograph could not enable the public to produce the
plant:54
[I]t must be borne in mind that there are inherent differences
between plants and manufactured articles. Should a plant variety
become extinct one cannot deliberately produce a duplicate even
though its ancestry and the techniques of cross-pollination be
known.
Manufactured articles, processes, and chemical
compositions when disclosed are, however, susceptible to manmade duplication. . . .
In the case of manufactured articles, processes and chemical
compositions, a different situation prevails. Written descriptions
and drawings in publications can often enable others to
manufacture the article, practice the process or produce the
chemical composition.55

46

. U.S. Plant Patent No. 47 (issued Nov. 29, 1932) (pecan).
. U.S. Plant Patent No. 3 (issued Oct. 20, 1931) (carnation).
48
. U.S. Plant Patent No. 99 (issued June 26, 1931) (hybrid barberry).
49
. U.S. Plant Patent No. 11 (issued Mar. 22, 1932) (hybrid tea rose).
50
. U.S. Plant Patent No. 18 (issued July 19, 1932) (plum).
51
. U.S. Plant Patent No. 8 (issued Feb. 23, 1932) (rose).
52
. U.S. Plant Patent No.. 7 (issued Feb. 16, 1932) (peach).
53
. Dunn v. Ragin v. Carlile, 50 U.S.P.Q. 472, 474 (Bd. Pat. App. &
Interf. 1941).
54
. In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
The decision,
rendered in the same year that Watson and Crick received the Nobel
Prize for their discovery of the structure of DNA, explicitly left open the
possibility that in some future case a printed publication might be
enabling, a remarkable insight.
55
. Id. at 935.
47
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“PRIOR ART” PLANTS?

Yet another challenge to obtaining a patent for a plant
was posed by the core requirement that patents are not
granted to inventions already available to the public.56 In
order to satisfy this requirement, there must be some way
of determining what the public already has access to and
how it differs from the claimed invention. In the later case
of Graham v. John Deere57 the Supreme Court explained the
test for determining whether an invention was too close to
already-available technology to be patentable:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at
issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness
or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined.58

Such a test requires that it be possible to identify the
relevant characteristics in the prior art and in the claimed
invention, and then to make a meaningful comparison
between them. As is apparent from the types of patents
granted shortly after enactment of the Plant Patent Act, 59
this would have posed a challenge in the context of plants.
The types of characteristics being claimed as distinguishing
the applicants’ plants would have required subjective
determinations and not have been amenable to
differentiation from prior art plants.
D. COULD CLAIMS BE PRECISE ENOUGH

TO IDENTIFY THE INVENTION?

Closely related to the problem of distinguishing the
claimed plant from pre-existing plants (and specifically,
whether a prior publication enables the claimed plant) is
the problem of how to define the claimed plant in such a
way that the public can tell what is being claimed. A
potential competitor is, under core patent principles,
entitled to know what is available for use and what would
constitute infringement.60 Distinguishing an allegedly
56

. This requirement is currently set forth in 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03. In
1930, the requirement would have been found in Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood, 11 How. 248 (1851).
57
. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
58
. Id. at 17. The section referred to in the decision was not enacted
until 1952, however, in Deere the Court held that enactment of § 103 did
not change the law with respect to obviousness.
59
. See supra text accompanying notes 46–52.
60
. See INTRODUCTION, supra.
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infringing plant from a patented plant would present
exactly the same difficulties as distinguishing a claimed
new plant from pre-existing plants.

III. THE 1930 SOLUTION: SPECIAL RULES FOR PLANTS
Congress addressed these concerns in the 1930 PPA,
which amended general utility patent law to provide:
Any person who has invented or discovered any new and useful
art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvements thereof, or who has invented or
discovered and asexually reproduced any distinct and new
variety of plant, other than a tuber-propagated plant, not known
or used by others in this country, before his invention or
discovery thereof, . . . may . . . obtain a patent therefor;61
“No plant patent shall be declared invalid for noncompliance . . .
if the description is as complete as is reasonably possible;”62

and to provide: “Every patent shall contain . . . a grant to
the patentee . . . of the exclusive right to make, use, and
vend the invention or discovery (including in the case of a
plant patent the exclusive right to asexually reproduce the
plant).”63 That enactment was intended to address each of
the problems posed above.
A. THE STATUTORY SUBJECT MATTER “SOLUTION”
Congress resolved the issue of whether plants could be
statutory subject matter simply by declaring it so under the
broad authority granted by the Constitution to promote
scientific progress.64 Congress limited protection to plants
61

. Act of May 23, 1930, ch. 312, sec. 1, § 4886, 46 Stat. 376
(emphasis added). The comparable provision of the current patent
statute is found in 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2000) (“Whoever invents or discovers
and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant, including
cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other
than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements
of this title. The provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions
shall apply to patents for plants, except as otherwise provided.”). The
1954 revision, which created the above language, made explicit that
plants found in an uncultivated state were not patentable. Act of Sept. 3,
1954, ch. 1259, 68 Stat. 1190.
62
. Act of May 23, 1930, ch. 312, sec. 2, § 4888, 46 Stat. 376.
63
. Act of May 23, 1930, ch. 312, sec. 1, § 4884, 46 Stat. 376 (current
version at 35 U.S.C. § 163 (2000)) (emphasis added).
64
. The Constitutional grant, “Congress shall have Power . . . to
Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
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reproduced asexually. The rationale is that asexual
propagation by divisions or cuttings produces clones, each
of which is identical to the parent plant and to all other
cuttings or clones taken from the parent, while the
production of seeds by cross-pollination does not assure a
true new plant variety having the characteristics desired.65
Congress also carved out an exception for tuberpropagated plants, accepting the argument that patents
should not be allowed to control the part of the plant which
was ultimately sold for food.66 In addition, the core patent
principle which precludes patenting naturally occurring
phenomena would translate, in the plant patent system, to
a prohibition on patenting uncultivated plants, and
Congress believed it had done so.67
In 1952, the patent statute was comprehensively
revised and plant patents placed into a separate chapter,
15 of Title 35.68
The United States Supreme Court
explained,
This was merely a housekeeping measure that did nothing to
change the substantive rights or requirements for a plant patent.
A “plant patent” continued to provide only the exclusive right to
asexually reproduce a protected plant, and the description
Writings and Discoveries,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, is arguably limited
to statutes which “promote progress,” but it would be hard to argue that
providing incentives for agricultural innovation falls outside that
mandate.
65
. In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929 (C.C.P.A. 1962); accord Yoder Bros. v.
Cal.-Fla. Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S.
1094 (1977) (“After a breeder has successfully isolated a new variety, the
only way he can preserve his creation is by means of asexual
reproduction . . . . Since a cutting is genetically identical to the parent
plant, it will develop into a plant whose characteristics match the parent’s
exactly, so long as the same environmental conditions obtain.”); id. at
1380 (“Asexual reproduction is literally the only way that a breeder can
be sure he has reproduced a plant identical in every respect to the
parent.”). However, a contemporary text notes that “[i]n general, plants
raised by asexual propagation reproduce the parent plant exactly, but
there are a few exceptions to the rule.” MONTAGUE FREE, PLANT PROPAGATION IN
PICTURES 53 (1957) (listing several examples of exceptions).
66
. It is hard to see a logical reason why that particular category
should receive special treatment from a patent perspective.
67
. “[T]he committee has, by its amendment in striking out the
patenting of ‘newly found’ varieties of plants, eliminated from the scope
of the bill these wild varieties discovered by the plant explorer or other
person who has in no way engaged either in plant cultivation or care and
who has in no other way facilitated nature in the creation of a new and
desirable variety.” S. REP. NO. 71-315, at 7 (1930).
68
. Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 804.
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requirement remained relaxed. To obtain a plant patent under §
161 a breeder must meet all of the requirements for § 101,
except for the description requirement.69

In 1970, recognizing that true-to-type reproduction had
become possible for sexually reproduced plants, Congress
passed the Plant Variety Protection Act70 (PVPA) to provide
“patent-like protection to novel varieties of sexually
reproduced plants (that is, plants grown from seed), which
parallels the protection afforded asexually reproduced
plant varieties (that is, varieties reproduced by propagation
or grafting)” under the Plant Patent Act.71 The PVPA was
not intended to preempt other forms of protection.72
B. THE DESCRIPTION/ENABLEMENT SOLUTION
Congress solved the description and enablement
problem
by
relaxing
the
general
utility
patent
requirements. The statute was revised to provide that a
patent which met the other requirements of the statute
would not be invalid simply for failure to comply with the
written description requirement “if the description is as
complete as is reasonably possible.”73 In 1930, no written
description could have enabled creation of a plant, even if
the ancestry and techniques of cross-pollination were
69

. J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124 (2001); 35
U.S.C. § 161, ¶ 2 (2000) (“The provisions of this title relating to patents
for inventions shall apply to patents for plants, except as otherwise
provided.”).
70
. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (1994). The Act was revised in 1994 to
conform to the 1991 UPOV convention, to which the U.S. is a signatory,
see B. Koo, C. Nottenburg & P.G. Pardey, Plants and Intellectual Property:
An International Appraisal, 306 SCIENCE 1295 (2004).
71
. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 180 (1995).
72
. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l. v. DeKalb Genetics, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1797,
1799 (S.D. Iowa 1999); see also MPEP, supra note 19, § 1601.
73

. Act of May 23, 1930, ch. 312, sec. 2, § 4888, 46 Stat. 376. The
comparable provision in the current statute is 35 U.S.C. § 162 (2000),
which provides: “No plant patent shall be declared invalid for
noncompliance with section 112 of this title if the description is as
complete as is reasonably possible. The claim in the specification shall
be in formal terms to the plant shown and described.” The 35 U.S.C. §
112 requirement of enablement is satisfied for plants if the disclosure in
the application is as complete as is reasonably possible. In re LeGrice,
301 F.2d 929 (C.C.P.A. 1962). The written description requirement of
§112 is relaxed by § 162. J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 127 (“To obtain a
plant patent under § 161 a breeder must meet all of the requirements for
§ 101, except for the description requirement.”).
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known—it was not possible to produce the plant from a
disclosure contemplated by 35 U.S.C. § 112 for other types
of manufactured articles. Thus, a reasonably complete
description of the new plant variety is all that could be
required. In addition, a patent applicant must allege
characteristics that distinguish the plant from similar
varieties.74
The general utility written description requirement
serves several purposes, however. Not only does it serve
the purpose of enabling others to make and use the
invention (the purpose Congress thought impossible to
meet), but it also serves to demonstrate that the invention
has in fact been completed. In Bourne v Jones, the court
recognized this second purpose, holding that obtaining a
plant patent requires that the applicant: (1) invent or
discover a new and distinct variety of plant and (2)
asexually reproduce the plant.75 Drawing on the utility
patent requirement that an invention requires a mental
step (conception of the invention), and a physical step
(reduction to practice),76 the court held that an invention
must be based on something definite and certain and, thus,
in the plant patent context, the invention of a new plant
variety was not complete until the plant was grown to the
point that its characteristics could be determined; one
cannot claim a plant until he discovers that the
characteristics described and claimed actually exist in the
plant.
An applicant bears the burden of clearly and
precisely describing those characteristics which define the
new variety as well as disclosing sufficient information to
show that those characteristics are present in the plant and
not in any other.
The characteristics that may distinguish a new variety would
include, among others, those of habit; immunity from disease; or
soil conditions; color of flower, leaf, fruit or stems; flavor;
productivity, including ever-bearing qualities in case of fruits;
storage qualities; perfume; form; and ease of asexual
74

. In re Greer, 484 F.2d 488 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
. Bourne v Jones, 114 F. Supp. 413 (D.C. Fla. 1951), aff’d 207 F.2d
173 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 897 (1953); accord In re Greer,
484 F.2d 488.
76
. In addition, because an acceptable utility patent application must
include an enabling disclosure, the application itself is considered a
constructive reduction to practice, sufficient to complete the invention
even in the absence of a physical reduction to practice. Frazer v.
Schlegel, 498 F.3d 1283, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
75
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reproduction. Within any one of the above or other classes of
characteristics the differences which would suffice to make the
variety a distinct variety, will necessarily be differences of
degree.77

As summarized in the patent office regulations, the
patent application “must contain as full and complete a
disclosure as possible of the plant and the characteristics
thereof that distinguish the same over related known
varieties, and its antecedents, and must particularly point
out where and in what manner the variety of plant has
been asexually reproduced.”78 The regulations require a
“detailed botanical description”79 and a single claim80
although the statute requires neither.
Specimens of the plant, or its flower or fruit, in a
quantity and at a time in its stage of growth as may be
designated, must be furnished, if required, for study and
inspection, although specimens “should not be submitted
unless specifically called for by the examiner.”81
In Ex parte Solomons,82 the Patent Office’s Board of
Patent Appeals held that the deposit of a specimen of a
microfungus with a public depository satisfied the “as
complete as is reasonably possible” requirement under 35
U.S.C. § 162.
More typically, however, the applicant
addresses the disclosure requirement by providing a
phenotypical description of selected characteristics of the
plant, and such descriptions are routinely accepted
provided the applicant discloses the defining physical
characteristics of the plant and demonstrates how those
characteristics distinguish the plant from others.83
77

. S. REP. NO. 71-315, at 4 (1930). Cases have added other
characteristics to the list. See, e.g., Imazio Nursery v. Dania Greenhouses,
69 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1018 (1996)
(resistance to cold, drought, heat, wind, or soil conditions); Jessel v.
Newland, 195 U.S.P.Q. 678 (1977) (resistance to cold, drought, heat,
wind, or soil conditions).
78
. 37 C.F.R. § 1.163 (a) (2006).
79
. 37 C.F.R. § 1.163 (c)(9) (2006).
80
. 37 C.F.R. § 1.163 (c)(10) (2006).
81
. 37 C.F.R. § 1.166 (2006). There are similar rules requiring deposit
of microorganisms related to patent applications. If the applicant in a
plant case has in fact made such a deposit, that may solve the
enablement problem discussed in Part V. A., infra.
82
. 201 U.S.P.Q. 42 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1978).
83
. “[T]his court, recognizing present technological limitations, has
concluded that there is no requirement for a how-to-make disclosure in a
plant patent application.” In re Greer, 484 F.2d 488, 491 (C.C.P.A. 1973)
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Congress did not specifically address the problem of
identifying, and distinguishing from, prior art plants,
leaving for the courts at least two questions: (1) on what
basis would a plant be considered distinguished from other
similar plants and (2) as between the first individual to
observe and the first individual to propagate, who would be
considered the inventor?
The legislative history suggests a partial answer to the
first question. The Senate Report states: “In order for the
new variety to be distinct it must have characteristics
clearly distinguishable from those of existing varieties and
it is immaterial whether in the judgment of the Patent
Office the new characteristics are inferior or superior to
those of existing varieties. Experience has shown the
absurdity of many views held as to the value of new
varieties at the time of their creation.”84 This suggests a
broad range of distinguishing characteristics might be
acceptable,85 and subsequently issued patents indicate that
the patent office in fact accepts a broad range of
characteristics.86 The Fifth Circuit defined “distinctness” as
the aggregate of the plant’s distinguishing characteristics.87
(citing In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 944 (C.C.P.A. 1962)). The court in
Greer continued:
Nevertheless, we do not agree that it was contemplated by
Congress that its incorporation into R.S. 4888 of the matter which
is the statutory predecessor to § 162 would operate to allow an
applicant to allege characteristics which might be capable of
distinguishing one variety of plant from another without sufficient
disclosure to establish that these characteristics are indeed
present in the claimed plant and absent in the varieties to which
it is most closely related. . . .
[I]f, as is true in this case, the characteristics chosen to define the
new plant are meaningless unless compared with predecessor
plant varieties, it is incumbent upon the applicant to provide
information of such a character that a meaningful comparison can
be made. It is our view that the Patent Office in this case was
justified in its conclusion that the criteria used to support the
claim did not allow for such a meaningful comparison. . . .
Id.
84
. S. REP. NO. 71-315, at 4 (1930).
85
. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
86
. See supra text accompanying notes 46–52 discussing color (e.g.,
U.S. Plant Pat. 8), flavor (e.g., U.S. Plant Pat. 47), hardiness (e.g., U.S.
Plant Pat. 99), productiveness (e.g., U.S. Plant Pat. 11), and keeping
qualities (e.g., U.S. Plant Pat. 3).
87
. Yoder Bros. v. Cal.-Fla. Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1378 (5th Cir.
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The answer to the second question is likewise
suggested by the statutory requirement that “Any person
who has . . . invented or discovered and asexually
reproduced any distinct and new variety of plant . . .
may . . . obtain a patent therefor.”88 The issue arose before
the patent office’s internal Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences in Ex parte Moore, where one individual had
noticed a peach tree with unusual characteristics but did
nothing to reproduce it, while a second individual (who
noticed the unusual characteristics later) propagated the
tree by cuttings.89 The court noted that the objective of
advancing the progress of science and useful arts was
furthered by the party whose actions had preserved for
posterity a variety that otherwise would have been lost and
held that invention consisted of appreciating and asexually
reproducing the new plant: the inventor is the one who
appreciates that the plant is new and propagates it by
asexual reproduction.90
In the case where two individuals work together, one of
whom propagates the plant asexually, without recognizing
its special properties, and the second of whom recognizes
its properties, they are joint inventors. In Bourne v. Jones,91
the court analogized the process of inventing a new plant
with that of inventing a new chemical compound and
concluded that the plant was jointly invented by the
individual who propagated a series of sugar cane plants
and the individual who selected the one from the series to
pursue and determined its characteristics:
Ordinarily, invention is construed to mean a mental operation
involving the conception of an idea, and a physical operation
involving reduction to practice of the mental concept. . . . [F]rom
the point of view of invention [of a plant], we have a situation
1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1094 (1977).
88
. Act of May 23, 1930, ch. 312, sec. 1, § 4886, 46 Stat. 376
(emphasis added). The comparable provision of the current patent
statute is found in 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2006): “Whoever invents or discovers
and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant, including
cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other
than . . . a plant found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent
therefor . . . . (emphasis added).
89
. Ex parte Moore, 115 U.S.P.Q. 145 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1957).
90
. Ex parte Moore, 115 U.S.P.Q. at 147.
91
. 114 F. Supp. 413 (D. Fla 1951) (finding joint inventorship and
invalidating a patent since only one of the joint inventors was named in
the application).
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remarkably similar to the situation involved in the invention of a
chemical compound. Because the properties or utilities of a new
chemical compound cannot be definitely determined until the
compound has been produced and tested for utility, it is usually
held in such cases that conception and reduction to practice are
simultaneous acts taking place at the time the characteristics and
the utility of the compound are isolated and identified . . . . [T]he
inventor of a chemical compound is held to be the one who first,
by actual test or practice, determines the characteristics and
utility of the compound. A scientific prediction of the compound’s
properties or utilities does not make the compound patentable.
The record is replete with expert opinion to the effect that only by
tedious, repetitious tests can one be certain of the characteristics
in a new variety of sugar cane . . . . Consequently, there could be
no invention or discovery of these patented varieties of sugar
cane prior to the time that the plants were grown and their
characteristics determined . . . . One could not claim such a
patent until he “discovers” that the characteristics described and
claimed for the plain under the patent exist in the plant.92

There is one other possibility to consider—the
possibility that the applicant’s own work may constitute
prior art, because the inventor delayed filing a patent
application long enough after disclosure of the invention to
constitute a statutory bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Under
general utility patent rules, a disclosure constitutes a
statutory bar only if it is enabling. The In re LeGrice court93
held that a description of a patented rosa floribunda plant
in a printed publication did not invalidate the patent since it
was not enabling, even though it was the same plant. The
mere disclosure of a photograph and description of
characteristics was held not to be enough to place a skilled
artisan in possession of the invention.
D. THE CLAIM SOLUTION
Also related to the description issue is the problem of
drafting a sufficiently precise claim to the new plant.94
Congress solved this problem by eliminating it, creating a
sui generis claim requirement for plants. Plant patent
claims are governed by § 162 rather than the general claim
requirements of § 112, and need only claim the plant “in
92

. Id. at 418–19 (citations omitted).
. 301 F.2d 929 (C.C.P.A. 1962). While holding a photograph of a
rose bush insufficient to enable the plant, the decision explicitly left open
the possibility that in some future case a printed publication might be
enabling.
94
. Both issues arise under 35 U.S.C. §112 (2000).
93
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formal terms to the plant shown and described.”95 The
patent office interprets this requirement as satisfied by a
claim of the form “I claim the new and distinct variety of
(fill in the species) plant, substantially as illustrated and
described herein”96 and its rules provide “under no
circumstances should the claim be directed to . . . fruit or
flower in contradistinction to the plant bearing the flower or
the tree bearing the fruit.”97

E. SUMMARY: THE PLANT PATENT REQUIREMENTS
Except as specifically modified by the PPA, the
requirements of the general utility statute apply.98 Thus, in
order to receive a plant patent, an inventor must file an
application with the U.S. Patent Office.99 The application is
reviewed by a patent examiner for compliance with the
patent statute which requires a determination that the
claimed subject matter:
1. is statutory subject matter, i.e., is a plant (within the
commonly understood definition of the word) which has
been asexually reproduced;
2. was found in a cultivated state;
3. has been asexually reproduced;100
95

. 35 U.S.C. § 162 ¶ 2. This provision was added in 1952. Act of July
19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 804.
96
. MPEP, supra note 19, § 1605 final ¶ (“An example of a proper
claim would be ‘A new and distinct variety of hybrid tea rose plant,
substantially as illustrated and described herein.’”).
97
. MPEP, supra note 19, § 1610 ¶ 2.
98
. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2000).
99
. 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (2000).
100
. “Asexual reproduction occurs by grafting, budding, or the like,
and produces an offspring with a genetic combination identical to that of
the single parent—essentially a clone.” J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hibred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 133 (2001).
In Imazio Nursery v Dania
Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995), reh’g en banc denied, 1996
US App LEXIS 2464, cert. denied, 116 S Ct 2549, the court defined
asexual reproduction as isolation of a group or mass of vegetative cells
from the parent plant that are capable of reproducing a plant that is
genetically an exact duplicate of its parent plant, noting that Congress
recognized that the asexual reproduction prerequisite greatly narrowed
the scope of protection of plant patents but found such a limitation
necessary to ensure that the characteristics of the plant to be patented
were maintained—asexual reproduction confirms the existence of a new
variety by separating variations resulting from fluctuations in
environmental conditions from true plant variations.
Post-1930
technology has added options for reliable propagation of true to type
plants which would not have met the 1930 definition of asexual

MAX STUL OPPENHEIMER, "THE 'REASONABLE PLANT' TEST: WHEN PROGRESS OUTRUNS
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 417-452 (2008).

THE

CONSTITUTION ," 9(2)

436

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
[Vol. 9:2
4. is distinguishable from other known plants;
5. is described101 and illustrated in the application in
sufficient102 detail; and
6. is claimed in a sufficiently specific manner.103
The theoretical differences between utility and plant
patents are summed up by the Fifth Circuit:
Normally, the three requirements for patentability are novelty,
utility, and non-obviousness. For plant patents, the requirement
of distinctness replaces that of utility, and the additional
requirement of asexual reproduction is introduced . . . The third
requirement, nonobviousness, is the hardest to apply to plants. . .
. The traditional three part test for obviousness, as set out in John
Deere inquires as to (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2)
the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, and
(3) the level of ordinary skill in the prior art. . . . Rephrasing the
John Deere tests for the plant world, we might ask about (1) the
characteristics of prior plants of the same general type, both
patented and nonpatented, and (2) the differences between the
prior plants and the claims at issue. We see no meaningful way to
apply the third criterion to plants—i.e. the level of ordinary skill in
the prior art. Criteria one and two are reminiscent of the
“distinctness” requirement already in the Plant Patent Act. Thus,
if we are to give obviousness an independent meaning, it must
refer to something other than observable characteristics. We
think that the most promising approach toward the obviousness
requirement for plant patents is reference to the underlying
constitutional standard that it codifies—namely, invention.104

Under the PPA
an inventor—in principle—can obtain a patent on any plant . . .
reproduction, for example apomixis, which involves producing genetically
identical plants from seeds. Koltunow, Bicknell & Chaudhury, Apomixis:
Molecular Strategies for the Generation of Genetically Identical Seeds
Without Fertilization, 108 PLANT PHYSIOL. 1345, 1345-52 (1995).
101
. Pan-American Plant Co. v. Matsui, 433 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. Cal.
1977) (disease resistance); Ex parte Rosenberg, 46 U.S.P.Q. 393 (Bd. Pat.
App. & Interf. 1939) (difference in leaf texture and structure distinguished
tobacco plant since flatter, more uniform leaf was preferable for cigarwrapping purposes).
102
. The Patent Office appears to have been satisfied that the
sufficiency requirement was met, in the majority of recently issued plant
patents, by reference to gross physical characteristics. Part IV. A., infra
argues that, although this may be common practice, it does not meet the
statutory requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 162 (2000).
103
. Plant patent claims are formal and follow the formula: “I claim the
new and distinct variety of (fill in the species) plant substantially as
illustrated and described herein.” Thus, the sufficiency of the claim turns
on the sufficiency of the illustration and description.
104
. Yoder Bros v. Cal.-Fla. Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1377-78 (5th
Cir. 1976) (internal citations omitted).
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that meets three requirements. It must be distinct; it must be
new; and on one or more occasions it must have been “asexually
reproduced,” e.g., reproduced by means of a graft . . . the
“asexual reproduction” requirement sought to ensure that the
inventor was capable of reproducing the new variety “asexually”
(through a graft) because that fact would guarantee that the
variety’s new characteristics had genetic (rather that, say,
environmental) causes and would prove genetically stable over
time.105

In holding that utility protection, as well as plant patent
protection, was available for plants, the Supreme Court
noted:
Whatever Congress may have believed about the state of patent
law and the science of plant breeding in 1930, plants have always
had the potential to fall within the general subject matter of §
101, which is a dynamic provision designed to encompass new
and unforeseen inventions. “A rule that unanticipated inventions
are without protection would conflict with the core concept of the
patent law that anticipation undermines patentability.”106

The Court’s analysis continued:
Petitioners essentially ask us to deny utility patent protection for
sexually reproduced plants because it was unforeseen in 1930
that such plants could receive protection under § 101. Denying
patent protection under § 101 simply because such coverage was
thought technologically infeasible in 1930, however, would be
inconsistent with the forward-looking perspective of the utility
patent statute. As we noted in Chakrabarty, “Congress employed
broad general language in drafting § 101 precisely because [new
types of] inventions are often unforeseeable.”107

Between the Patent Office’s 1985 decision that plants
qualified for utility patent protection108 and the Supreme
Court’s 2001 decision confirming that the PPA did not
preempt the utility statute,109 the PTO issued “some 1,800
utility patents for plants.”110
F. THE INFRINGEMENT PRICE
Although
Congress
relaxed
several
disclosure
standards for plants, it also modified the definition of
infringement from a prohibition of manufacture, use or sale
105

. J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 150 (2001)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
106
. Id. at 135 (internal citations omitted).
107
. Id. (internal citations omitted).
108
. Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443, (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1985).
109
. J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. 124.
110
. Id. at 145.
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of a product embodying the claimed invention to “the
exclusive right to asexually reproduce the plant.”111 As
explained by the Supreme Court, “The PPA thus gave
patent protection to breeders who were previously unable
to overcome the obstacles described in Chakrabarty” but
the protection was limited to asexually-reproduced plants,
the only type which could be reproduced true-to-type at the
time.112
A question remained as to whether the exclusive right
to asexually reproduce “the” plant limited infringement to
plants derived from the original plant which formed the
basis for the patent, or extended to any plant which had
the characteristics claimed in the patent.
The prevailing view is that to establish infringement of
a plant patent, the patentee must prove that the alleged
infringing plant is an asexually reproduced progeny of the
patented plant113 and that the infringement is complete
when the propagation takes place—it is not necessary for
the infringing plant to have reached maturity.114 This view
111

. 35 U.S.C. § 163 (2000).
. J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 134. “All such plants must be
asexually reproduced in order to have their identity preserved. This is
necessary since seedlings either of chance or self-pollenization from any
of these would not preserve the character of the individual.” S. REP. NO.
71-315, at 3 (1930).
113
. Van Well Nursery, Inc. v. Mony Life Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1321
(E.D. Wash. 2006).
In the present case, I am of the view that not only has the
plaintiff failed to prove by clear and convincing proof that the
trees grown by the defendant are an infringement upon his
patent but that, on the contrary, there is ample proof to show
that the trees grown by the plaintiff were a sport or mutation
of the Le Grand tree. This conclusion is not in any way
weakened by the testimony in the record given by a wellknown scientist in the field of genetics that sports or
mutations in the nectarine field are rare.
Kim Bros. v. Hagler, 167 F. Supp. 665, 669 (S.D. Cal. 1958), aff’d 276 F.2d
259 (9th Cir. 1960). “Conceding that the plants of the plaintiff and of the
defendants have similar characteristics, the proof is not clear and
convincing that the plaintiff must have appropriated plants or cuttings
belonging to [plaintiff] or his assignee.” Cole Nursery Co. v. Youdath
Perennial Gardens, 17 F. Supp. 159, 160 (N.D. Ohio 1936). But see PanAmerican Plant Co. v. Matsui, 433 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. Cal 1977) (holding
that a plant could infringe even though not a clone of the plant claimed in
the patent).
114
. Yoder v. Cal.-Fla. Plant, 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied. 429 U.S. 1094 (1977). (“On cross appeal, Cal-Florida asserts that
the absence of flowering plants grown from the cuttings it had admittedly
112
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is also logically consistent with the 1930s view that only
asexual propagation assured preservation of the claimed
character-istics.115 Thus, to the extent that the description
of physical characteristics represented a technologically
imposed relaxation of the disclosure and enablement
requirements of utility patent law, there is an offsetting
compensation through the infringement provisions—the
plant is not described well enough to enable others to
independently make it, so if they do independently make it,
it is not infringement. In Imazio Nursery v Dania
Greenhouses,116 the Federal Circuit specifically recognized
a defense of independent creation, holding that
notwithstanding proof of the defendant’s asexual
reproduction of a plant having the same characteristics as
the patented plant, the plain meaning of the statute
required asexual reproduction of the patented plant for
there to be infringement, and rejecting the trial court’s
concern that the “patent holder would have great
difficulties enforcing his patent rights if a defendant were
allowed to raise independent creation as an affirmative
defense.”117
This view also produces an internally consistent fiction.
Patentable plants are limited to those produced by asexual
taken from Yoder’s patented plants was fatal to Yoder’s infringement
counts. This is because the patent claim in each instance describes a
mature flowering plant, and it is Cal-Florida’s position that only another
mature flowering plant could directly infringe . . . . We agree with Yoder
that it was not necessary to prove that the cuttings actually matured into
flowered plants to show infringement. Under such a rule, it would be
virtually impossible for a propagator-distributor directly to infringe a
patent, despite the vital role he plays in dissemination of plant
material.”).
115
. Congress recognized that the asexual reproduction prerequisite
greatly narrowed the scope of protection of plant patents but found such
a limitation necessary to ensure that the characteristics of the plant to be
patented were maintained, since asexual reproduction confirms the
existence of a new variety by separating variations resulting from
fluctuations in environmental conditions from true plant variations.
Imazio Nursery v Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
reh’g en banc, denied, 1996 US App LEXIS 2464, cert. denied, 116 S Ct
2549.
116
. 69 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995), reh’g, en banc, denied, 1996 US
App LEXIS 2464, cert denied, 116 S Ct 2549; see also Van Well Nursery v.
Mony Life Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (E.D. Wash. 2006).
117
. The district court was concerned that it would be difficult for the
patentee to refute a defense of independent creation since the critical
evidence would be in the alleged infringer’s control.
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propagation since this assures that the progeny will be
identical to the parent plant and thus will, by definition,
assure that each of the progeny will have the
characteristics claimed to distinguish the patented plant.
“Since a cutting is genetically identical to the parent plant,
it will develop into a plant whose characteristics match the
parent’s exactly, so long as the same environmental
conditions obtain.”118 It is internally consistent that if
“asexual reproduction is literally the only way that a
breeder can be sure he has reproduced a plant identical in
every respect to the parent”119 then the only way to be sure
that an infringement has taken place is to tie it to the
original, patented, plant.

IV. THE PROBLEM: 17,000 INVALID PATENTS?
Others have called for revisions to the plant patent
statute, to provide greater clarity and stronger protection
for genetic inventions.120 In fact, “a special Presidential
Commission, noting the special problems that plant
protection raised and favoring the development of a totally
new plant protection scheme, had recommended that ‘all
provisions in the patent statute for plant patents be
deleted . . . .’”121
If the requirement of § 161 is read literally, so as to
require an applicant for a plant patent to provide a
“reasonably complete” description of the claimed plant,
then applications which do not do so should not be granted
and those which are granted should be declared invalid.
Given the advances in plant technology described below,122
it would appear that applications should have begun
including genetic descriptions in lieu of (or in addition to)
physical characteristics, possibly as early as 1960 but
118

. In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929 (C.C.P.A. 1962); accord Yoder v. CalifFla. Plant, 537 F.2d 1347, 1352 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 US 1094
(1977).
119
. Yoder, 537 F.2d 1347, 1380.
120
. See, e.g., Christopher E. James, Note, The Impact on Agricultural
Research by Genetic Material Patents and the Need for Clarity and
Reform in Patent Law for Genetic Material, 11 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 253 (2006).
121
. J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 150 (2001)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing President’s Commission on the Patent
System, To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts, S. DOC. NO. 90-5, at 20–21
(1967)).
122
. See infra Part IV. B.
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certainly beginning by 2000. A review of a sampling of
plant patents indicates that this has not happened.
Whether this means that roughly 17,000 plant patents are
invalid depends on analysis of several issues:
1. Does the statute freeze “reasonableness” on the
date of enactment in 1930 (or recodification in 1952), or is
it a contemporary standard, advancing as technology
advances?
2. If the standard is contemporary, has it changed
since 1930 (and if so, what is it now)?
3. Is there a policy reason, based on administrative
impossibility,
which
precludes
examining
patent
applications which are based on genetic, rather than
physical characteristic, descriptions?
4. Is there a policy reason, based on a desire not to
invalidate essentially every plant patent issued in the last
decade or two, to ignore technological advances since
1930?

A. DID

THE

PPA FREEZE

THE

STANDARD

FOR

DISCLOSURE

AS OF

ENACTMENT?

Section 162 absolves applicants for plant patents of the
duty to provide an enabling disclosure of their inventions if
“the description is as complete as is reasonably possible.”
The provision was first enacted in 1930 and most recently
considered in the 1952 recodification of the patent statute.
Could Congress have intended to set, and freeze, the
standard for reasonable possibility at either of those dates?
Such an interpretation seems highly unlikely, for several
reasons. First, when Congress recodified the statute in
1952, it did not indicate in the legislative history that it was
also “resetting the clock” with respect to plant patent
disclosure requirements—if the statute was intended to
freeze the standard, one would expect such a statement.
Furthermore, the patent statute is the vehicle for
motivating technological progress and it would seem odd
that a technology-motivating statute would freeze its
standards for invention at a specific point in time.
In fact, two of the more common activities of patent
examiners in reviewing applications are an evaluation of
the claimed invention in comparison with the prior art123
and (for utility patents) an evaluation of the sufficiency of
123

. The comparison is mandated by 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 & 103 (2000).
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the disclosure.124 Both evaluations are made as of a thencurrent date, not the date when the relevant statutory
sections were enacted. While the issue does not appear to
have been raised, the J.E.M.125 case arguably provides
inferential support for the contemporary technology
standard, since it holds the 1930 Congress’ incorrect belief,
based on 1930 technology, irrelevant to the issue of
preemption.126
It is no answer that, at the time of enactment, Congress
did not foresee the genetic breakthroughs of the late 20th
century. As the Supreme Court has noted:
Denying patent protection under § 101 simply because such
coverage was thought technologically infeasible in 1930,
however, would be inconsistent with the forward-looking
perspective of the utility patent statute. As we noted in
Chakrabarty, “Congress employed broad general language in
drafting § 101 precisely because [new types of] inventions are
often unforeseeable.”127

In J.E.M., the Court noted that although the legislative
history of the Plant Patent Act suggests a general
perception existed in 1930 that plants could not be
patented:
“[t]his does not mean, however, that prior to 1930 plants could
not have fallen within the subject matter of § 101. Rather, it
illustrates only that in 1930 Congress believed that plants were
not patentable under § 101, both because they were living things
and because in practice they could not meet the stringent
description requirement. Yet these premises were disproved over
time. As this Court held in Chakrabarty, “the relevant distinction”
for purposes of § 101 is not “between living and inanimate things,
but between products of nature, whether living or not, and
human-made inventions.” In addition, advances in biological
knowledge and breeding expertise have allowed plant breeders
to satisfy § 101’s demanding description requirement.128

The emphasized language makes clear that, while the
statutory language regarding the level of disclosure
required for a plant patent has not changed, the state of
scientific knowledge has—this change in scientific
knowledge translates into a heightened requirement for
patentability. This is not an unusual occurrence in patent
124

. The requirement for an adequate description for utility
applications is mandated by 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
125
. J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. 124.
126
. See supra notes 30–38 and accompanying text.
127
. J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 135 (internal citations omitted).
128
. Id. at 134 (internal citations omitted; emphasis added).
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law. The general standard for patentability is set by
reference to the then-current state of the art. The normal
course of scientific progress dictates that
discoveries
which are astonishing and patentable in one era become
commonplace and therefore unpatentable in a later era.
While J.E.M. was concerned with patentability under § 101,
the same argument applies to § 162, which exempts plant
patents from the written description requirement of § 112
only “if the description is as complete as is reasonably
possible.”129
As scientific advances have made more
complete descriptions “reasonably possible,” the statute
requires applicants to provide them.
Thus, many issued plant patents are invalid for failure
to meet the “do your best” requirement, because of natural
developments which resulted in changes to what is “best.”
The above analysis indicates that there is an evolving
standard of reasonableness, but only because Congress
has chosen it. There does not appear to be a Constitutional
mandate that the standard must continue to evolve.130
Thus, if this is not the result Congress wants, it could clarify
the statute to set a fixed date for determining the
adequacy of plant patent disclosures. It could also provide
a dividing line, possibly even a grace period allowing
pending applications to be examined under one standard
but future applications to be evaluated under a different
standard.

B. WHAT

IS THE

CURRENT STATE

OF THE

ART

IN

REASONABLENESS?

If the standard for reasonableness progresses along
with the progress of the relevant technology, it becomes
important to establish how that standard has evolved from
1930 to the present, and how to determine the standard at
any particular time.
When the PPA was enacted in 1930, Mendel’s theory of
genetics was well-accepted, having gone through a period
of doubt but then rehabilitated, and dictated that only
129

. 35 U.S.C. § 162 (2000) (“No plant patent shall be declared invalid
for noncompliance with § 112 of this title if the description is as complete
as is reasonably possible.”) .
130
. One can construct an argument that motivating progress requires
a “moving statutory target” in order to assure that a point will not be
reached where no further progress is possible. The argument does not
seem compelling.
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asexual
propagation
would
assure
true-to-type
reproduction of the physical characteristics of a plant;
sexual propagation would result in hybrids, some of which
would resemble one parent, some of which would resemble
the other parent and some of which would resemble
neither. While it was understood that genetics played a
controlling role in determining those characteristics, the
connection between DNA and genetics was unknown. The
standard for describing and categorizing plants was based
on observable physical characteristics—the phenotype
which was the result of the then unobservable genetic code
which produced it.
It was not until 1935 that Andrei Belozersky isolated
DNA. The structure (as opposed to chemical composition)
of DNA remained a puzzle until James Watson and Francis
Crick discovered its double helical structure131 and reported
it in Nature in 1953. They received the 1962 Nobel Prize
for the discovery. Starting in the mid-1960’s, efforts were
made
to
distinguish
plants
based
on
chemical
components.132 The manner in which the DNA molecule
controlled the production of amino acids was discovered by
Marshall Nirenberg in 1966. David Botstein discovered
that, when the DNA from different people was cut using a
restriction enzyme, certain of the resulting fragments had
different lengths.133 The reliability of the technology in
identifying individuals as the source of a DNA sample was
accepted in a U.S. criminal case in 1987. 134 A conviction
based on DNA evidence was affirmed by a state court of
131

. The discovery was made on February 28, 1953.
. “During the last 40 years, there has been sustained interest in the
ability to identify individual hop varieties by the essential oil and resin
components . . . Since 1982, the composition of essential oils has been
studied at the Institute for Hop Research and Brewing Zalec. . .” Cerenak
et. al., Identification and Differentiation of Hop Varieties Using Simple
Sequence Repeat Markers, 62 J. AM. SOC. BREW CHEM . 1 (2004). However,
“[i]t was shown that the organoleptic evaluation is fairly subjective. . .”
Id.
133
. The fragments are referred to as Restriction Fragment Length
Polymorphisms (RFLPs) and, with the addition of genetic enhancement
techniques, such as PCR, became the basis for “DNA fingerprinting”
(invented by Alec Jeffreys in 1984).
An alternative identification
technology, Expressed Sequence Tags (ESTs) was at the center of
controversy when, in 1997, the patent office announced that it would
consider patents for ESTs.
134
. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
132
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last resort in 1989.135 In December, 1999, Nature carried
the news of completion of the first complete DNA sequence
of a plant chromosome,136 which was followed a year later
with the “cracking” of the human genetic code.137
Researchers have continued to sequence other plant
species’ DNA using a variety of techniques.138 In the
comparable area of patents for gene sequences, there has
been dramatic growth. Between 1980 and 2000, just 2,000
patents were issued for gene and gene sequences.
Recently, more than 70,000 applications were pending
before the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) for similar patents.139
135

. State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253 (W. Va. 1989).
. K. Mayer et al., Sequence and Analysis of Chromosome 4 of the
Plant Arabidopsis Thaliana, 402 NATURE 769 (1999); Xiaoying Lin et al.,
Sequence and Analysis of Chromosome 2 of the Plant Arabidopsis
Thaliana, 402 NATURE 761 (1999). A press release was issued by the
National Science Foundation’s Office of Legislative and Public Affairs on
December 15, 1999; the Nature article appeared on December 16. Press
Release, Nat’l Sci. Found., Scientists Report First Complete DNA
Sequence of Plant Chromosomes, (Dec. 15, 1999),
available at
http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2000/pr9973/pr9973.txt. An earlier advance
toward the complete sequence was reported in 1993. Holte et. al., An
Inventory of 1152 Expressed Sequence Tags Obtained from Partial
Sequencing of cDNAs from Arabidopsis Thaliana, 4 PLANT J. 1051 (1993)
(“these results underscore the efficiency with which new plant genes can
be identified through partial sequencing of anonymous DNAs”).
137
. The first plant chromosome completed was Arabidosis thaliana,
which has an approximately 125 Megabase genome. In contrast, the
human genome consists of roughly 3 billion base pairs.
138
. See, e.g., Slightom et. al., Complete Nucleotide Sequence of a
French Bean Storage Protein Gene: Phaseolin, 80 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI.
1897 (1983); Theologis, et. al., Sequence Analysis of Chromosome 1 of
the Plant Arabadopsis Thaliana, 408 NATURE 816 (2000); Cerenak et. al.,
Identification and Differentiation of Hop Varieties Using Simple Sequence
Repeat Markers, J. AM. SOC. BREW CHEM. 1 (2004) (“Randomly amplified
polymorphic DNA (RAPD), sequenced tag sites (STS) markers, and
microsatellites have been used to some extent for identity typing and hop
cultivar identification.”). Citing RAPD studies from 1991 and 1994, an STS
study from 1998 and microsatellite studies from 1996 and 2001, Cerenak
et al. report that “five polymorphic microsatellites are capable of
differentiating among all culivars included, except cultivars derived from
clonal selection, polyploidy, or mutations.” Id. at 7. Bausher, et. al., The
Complete Chloroplast Genome Sequence of Citrus Sinensis (L.) Osbeck
var ‘Ridge Pineapple’: Organization and Phylogenetic Relationships to
Other Angiosperms, 6 BMC PLANT BIOLOGY 21 (2006) (comparing DNA and
EST sequences). “We have sequenced the Citrus chloroplast genome to
facilitate genetic improvement of this crop.” Id.
139
. James, supra note 120, at 256.
136
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The rationale for limiting plant patents to asexual
reproduction is explained in the Senate Report
accompanying the bill: “All such plants must be asexually
reproduced in order to have their identity preserved. This is
necessary since seedlings either of chance or selfpollenization from any of these would not preserve the
character of the individual.”140 Post-1930 technology has
added options for reliable propagation of true-to-type
plants which would not have met the 1930 definition of
asexual reproduction, for example apomixis, a technique
for producing genetically identical plants from the seeds of
certain types of plants.141 In fact, apomixis may offer
advantages over vegetative propagation: “Clonal seed
would help avoid costly and time-consuming vegetative
propagation methods that are currently used to ensure the
large scale production of these crops.”142 Research is
underway to develop techniques for enabling apomixis in
plants which do not have the capability naturally.143 Thus,
the first consequence is that the range of reproduction
techniques covered by the PPA must be expanded to
include modern techniques, and not be limited to
techniques considered by the 1930 Congress.
The second consequence which follows is that the
emerging standard of disclosure has undergone several
changes since 1930. While there may be legitimate debate
over the exact date when a particular change occurred, it is
clear that sometime after the mid-1960’s, at least some
plant patent applications (those which claimed distinction
from the prior art based on such factors) should have
provided chemical analyses of the claimed plant and of the
nearest prior art plants.144 It is also clear that sometime
140

. S. REP. NO. 71-315, at 3 (1930). Asexual propagation “is a term
applied to the propagation of plants from parts other than seeds or
spores.” MONTAGUE FREE, PLANT PROPAGATION IN PICTURES 53 (1957).
141
. Anna M. Koltunow, Ross A. Bicknell, & Abdul M. Chaudhury,
Apomixis: Molecular Strategies for the Generation of Genetically Identical
Seeds Without Fertilization, 108 PLANT PHYSIOLOGY 1345 (1995).
142
. Id. at 1346.
143
. Id. at 1351.
144
. “During the last 40 years, there has been sustained interest in the
ability to identify individual hop varieties by the essential oil and resin
components . . . Since 1982, the composition of essential oils has been
studied at the Institute for Hop Research and Brewing Zalec . . . .”
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after the December, 1999, Nature article reporting a
complete DNA sequence of a plant chromosome and
subsequent perfection
of other DNA-based plant
identification techniques,145 the standard would require that
a plant patent application include disclosure of DNA
sequences.

D. CAN

THE

SYSTEM HANDLE VALID DISCLOSURES?

Notwithstanding the above analysis, it would make no
sense to require a type of disclosure which the patent office
was incapable of evaluating. One of the challenges for
examination of plant patent applications is the difficulty of
finding relevant prior art.
Under the 1930 “physical
characteristic” standard, the problem is identifying prior art
plants and comparing sometimes subjective characteristics;
under a 21st century DNA based standard, the problem will
be locating appropriate databases and a language which
facilitates comparison. The statute (and President Hoover’s
executive order) provided for the assistance of the
Department of Agriculture,146 which presumably has
expertise in both areas. Databases which are well-suited to
this type of analysis are already maintained by the National
Institutes of Health (NIH).147
Cerenak et. al., supra note 138, at 1. However, “[i]t was shown that the
organoleptic evaluation is fairly subjective . . .” Id.
145
. See Press Release, Nat’l Sci. Found., Scientists Report First
Complete DNA Sequence of Plant Chromosomes, (Dec. 15, 1999),
available at http:// www.nsf.gov/pubs/2000/pr9973/pr9973.txt. Earlier
dates are also arguable: 1993, the date of the Holte article in The Plant
Journal, supra note 136; 1988, the date when Andrews was decided,
supra note 134; or 1989, when the appellate court acknowledged the
reliability of DNA testing in Woodall, supra note 135, or some
“reasonable” period of time following each of these events.
146
. In re Greer, 484 F.2d 488, 489 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (“In conformance
with the usual procedure for the examination of applications for plant
patents, the application was submitted by the Patent Office to the
Department of Agriculture for its evaluation of the assertions made in the
specification supporting the claim that the grass was a distinct and new
variety of plant. In due course a report was provided by the Department
of Agriculture to the Patent Office . . . .”).
147
. One example is the BLAST program, which provides a library of
known DNA and related sequences and software for entering a new
sequence and determining whether a similar one already exists in the
database. See, e.g., National Center for Biotechnology Information, Basic
Local
Alignment
Search
Tool
(BLAST),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/blast/Blast.cgi?CMD=Web
&PAGE_TYPE=BlastHome (last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
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Moreover, this is a challenge of a type which the USPTO
has faced successfully before. In 1996, Commissioner
Lehman reported on the administrative aftermath of the
Supreme Court’s Chakrabarty decision: “For over a decade,
the PTO has been examining and granting patents to claims
reciting nucleic acid sequences.”148
The most recent
challenge to the PTO’s ingenuity in examining new
technologies was the Federal Circuit’s decision in State
Street Bank.149 In response to that decision, which held
business method patents statutory, the PTO tripled the
number of examiners assigned to the field and identified
new
databases
to
be
searched
in
determining
patentability.150 There was a learning curve, manifested in a
longer than average delay in initially acting on business
method patents while the PTO adjusted, but by the end of
2001 the average pendency of a business method
application was within three months of the overall PTO
average.151 Thus, the PTO faces a problem of execution,
148

. Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Sec’y of Commerce and the Comm’r
of Patents and Trademarks, Public Hearing on Patenting of Nucleic Acid
Sequences (Apr. 23, 1996) (transcript available at http://www.uspto.gov/
web/ offices/com/sol/notices/seq-hear.txt).
149
. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, 149
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
150
. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, A USPTO WHITE PAPER: AUTOMATED FINANCIAL
OR MANAGEMENT DATA PROCESSING METHODS (BUSINESS METHODS) 9–21 (2000),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/ menu/busmethp/index.html. In
the two years from the Federal Circuit decision to the publication of the
White Paper, the PTO had increased the number of examiners in Class
705 from twelve to thirty-eight and reported that “Seventeen of the 38
examiners have advanced or multiple degrees. Of these 4 have an MBA
or other business degrees, 4 have a JD degree, 4 have Ph.D. degrees, and
7 have Masters Degrees.” Id. at 14. The PTO had also identified
databases of non-patent literature (NPL) which examiners are to consult
in addition to searching the patent database, including Dialog and the
Software Patent Institute and the IEEE/IEE Electronic Library databases.
Id. at 21. See also U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Business Methods Still
Experiencing Substantial Growth—Report of Fiscal year 2001 Statistics,
http://www.uspto.
gov/web/menu/pbmethod/fy2001strport.html
(last
visited Mar. 19, 2008).
151
. “The average pendency to first action in Class 705 is 23.5 months.
This can be compared to an average pendency to first action of 14.6
months for the entire USPTO. The average time to disposal is 28.5
months in Class 705. This can be compared to an average time to
disposal of 25.6 months for the entire USPTO.” U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, Business Methods Still Experiencing Substantial Growth—Report of
Fiscal
year
2001
Statistics,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/pbmethod/fy2001strport.html
(last
visited Mar. 19, 2008).
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not theory. In addition, it has tools at its disposal to
facilitate execution and can draw on expertise from other
agencies, such as the Department of Agriculture, the Food
and Drug Administration and the NIH.

E. CAN

THE

SYSTEM TOLERATE INVALIDATING 17,000 PATENTS?

Notwithstanding the statutory command and the ability
of the responsible agency to carry it out, the consequent
invalidity of a large number of patents is a factor to
consider. It would be awkward for a system designed to
promote progress by providing economic incentives to
deprive innovators of that incentive on a wholesale basis.
One answer would be that the core principles of patent law
require an exchange: the economic incentive is provided,
not for innovation, but for disclosure—if the disclosure is
inadequate, the incentive has not been earned.
The
problem is not completely unanticipated—it has at least
been hinted at in early cases:
While the present knowledge of plant genetics may mean as a
practical matter, that the descriptions in such general
publications as are here involved cannot be relied upon as a
statutory bar . . . we must be mindful of the scientific efforts
which are daily adding to the store of knowledge in the fields of
plant heredity and plant eugenics which one skilled in this art will
be presumed to possess . . . . Current studies to “break the
chromosome code” may also add to the knowledge of plant
breeders so that they may someday secure possession of a plant
invention by a description in a printed publication as is now
possible in other fields of inventive effort.152

Fortunately, there are avenues for accomplishing both
objectives: rescuing many of the patents that would
otherwise be invalid, and obtaining the disclosure.
V. CONSEQUENCES OF A 21st CENTURY APPROACH
A. WHAT CAN BE DONE

FOR

EXISTING PATENTS

AND

APPLICATIONS?

What can be done to “save” invalid plant patents, and
pending applications that cannot lead to a valid patent,
depends on the stage the applicant has reached.
Applications which have not yet been filed offer the
greatest chance for validity, followed by pending
152

. In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 941 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (internal footnote
omitted).
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applications, patents issued less than two years ago and
finally patents issued more than two years ago.

1. Unfiled Applications
Unfiled applications offer the greatest opportunity for
producing a valid patent.
Those applications can be
drafted to include a distinguishing genetic sequence or can
be supported by a deposit of genetic material in a publicly
accessible facility.
2. Pending Applications
Those applications which include genetic sequences, or
which included a deposit of a sample of the plant, comply
with the requirements of disclosure and need do nothing
further. Those which do not face the problem that, as filed,
the application is insufficient. Once an application for a
patent has been filed, the ability to amend it is limited:
changes may be made, but “new matter” may not be
added. However, with respect to plant patents, an internal
patent office rule provides
if the written description is deficient, “a clarification or additional
description of the plant, or even a wholesale substitution of the
original description so long as not totally inconsistent and
unrelated to the original description and photograph of the plant
may be submitted in reply to an Office action.” Such submission
will not constitute new matter . . .153

Thus, many pending applications can be saved by
providing additional description of the plant, consisting of
appropriate DNA sequence information. This could be
facilitated (and the argument for validity strengthened) if
the patent office requested such clarification in an office
action. Alternatively, the patent office could exercise its
authority to request specimens of the plant.
3. Issued Patents: Less than Two Years Out
The patent statute permits a patentee to request a
broadening reissue within two years from the issue date of
the patent. Patentees in this category could file such a
request and follow the procedure outlined above.

153

. MPEP, supra note 19, § 1605 (citing Jessel v. Newland, 195
U.S.P.Q. 678, 684 (Dep. Comm’r Pat. 1977)) (emphasis added).
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There does not appear to be any procedure under the
current statute for “rescuing” patents which were issued
more than two years ago. Moreover, given the number of
patents which might be saved under one of the above
procedures, the policy reasons for facilitating their rescue,
and the burden that thousands of amendments and
requests for reissue would place on patent office resources,
Congress might well want to solve the problem
legislatively. It could, for example, amend the statute to
provide a future effective date for specifically requiring
genetic information, while grandfathering applica-tions filed
before that date.
B. REDEFINING WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
The written description requirement has two roles with
respect to patents: description and enablement. Including
a DNA sequence not only provides a contemporary
description which is better than the historical physical
description, but may also at some point in the future
provide the basis for enablement. Thus, should Congress
choose to “save” defective applications, it should require
that the applications be supplemented with the best DNA
information available.
C. REDEFINING WHAT CAN BE CLAIMED
There is a potential benefit for plant inventors. Current
patent rules provide “under no circumstances should the
claim be directed to . . . fruit or flower in contradistinction
to the plant bearing the flower or the tree bearing the
fruit.”154 This limitation made sense in the context of
physical descriptions.155 However, if the plant is defined,
not by gross physical properties but by genetic makeup,
there is no principled reason why the claim could not be to
the entire plant or any part thereof, since all parts of the
same plant would share the same DNA. Thus, the statute
could be amended to permit multiple claims in a plant
patent.

154
155

. Id. § 1610 (second paragraph).
. See supra notes 73–83 and accompanying text.
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In 1930, Congress felt it had no choice but to provide
special statutory provisions to protect inventors of plants.
Those
special
provisions
allowed
simplified,
and
approximate, disclosure but limited protection compared
with general utility patents.
It is no longer necessary to use approximations. Better
disclosures, with potential benefits to the public, are now
possible. The patent office and courts should demand
those better disclosures. In many cases, this can be
accomplished under existing law. To the extent Congress
finds the results to be poor public policy, it has the power
to amend the statute to provide temporary relief. In
addition, Congress can also provide broader protection to
plant inventors in exchange for the better disclosures which
technological advances have made possible.

